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Constraining Moses: Rethinking 
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations  
Paul Baumgardner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern American presidents enjoy an extensive reserve of 
formal and informal powers, which have developed in accordance 
with the historical, institutional, and ideological changes across 
the federal government. In recent months, many Americans have 
felt the reach and impact of one particular power—the president’s 
rhetorical power. Long before Donald Trump told the American 
people that “there is blame on both sides” in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, political scientists had begun researching the outsized 
capital that presidential discourse can marshal.1 A president’s 
words possess an unparalleled institutional power to arrange 
and rearrange the populace—to motivate action, encourage 
restraint, to assuage strife, and also to send peasants scrambling 
for pitchforks. 
Our political knowledge of a president’s rhetorical power 
ought to inform and complicate how we analyze the 
constitutionality of certain presidential practices. In this article, I 
focus on one such presidential practice: Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamations. The presidential tradition of offering Thanksgiving 
Proclamations began with our first president, George Washington, 
and it has remained a common—but not constant—oratorical 
practice of American presidents up to the present. However, 
Thanksgiving Proclamations have sustained a fair degree of legal 
and political scrutiny, even during the founding generation. 
In this article, I examine the core criticisms of Thanksgiving 
Proclamations that have connected certain Founders, such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, with contemporary 
Supreme Court Justices. Jeffersonian and Madisonian concerns 
about religious entanglement and endorsement align with recent 
 
 * Paul Baumgardner is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and the 
Humanities Council at Princeton University. During the 2017–2018 academic year, he is 
a visiting fellow in the Institute for Law and Philosophy at Rutgers Law School. 
 1 Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on 
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html? mcubz=1&_r=0. 
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 4:19 PM 
20 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
Supreme Court cases and constitutional standards concerning 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. As currently 
understood by some members of the Court, the First Amendment’s 
prohibition on government actions respecting an establishment of 
religion brings the content of Thanksgiving Proclamations under 
sharp scrutiny.  
Although the Supreme Court has not yet deemed 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to be unconstitutional, 
it has criticized and, in some cases, struck down similar calls to 
prayer. In this article, I unpack the political, legal, and historical 
arguments against presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
outline some of the advantages of “constraining Moses.” 
The reasons for selecting this particular presidential 
rhetorical practice are manifold, but one of the most intriguing 
certainly is the political preparatory work/worries that already 
have been accomplished—prematurely—in anticipation of this 
very article.2 To be clear: I do not advocate for the 
end of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. However, it is 
important to uncover the best variations of these arguments, 
including the sort of resources that they should draw on.3 In 
the final analysis, these arguments may not supply the best 
moral or constitutional course for future Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.4 Rather, this thesis-less article is designed to 
highlight the pieces that seem best ordered for justifying this 
constitutional direction, even if such a direction proves unlikely or 
unwarranted in the current political climate.  
So let us jump in. First, an introduction to a spectrum of 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In Section II, a brief 
 
 2 We built this moated fortress and have had it manned for years, because we knew 
your horde would eventually come! See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100–03, 113 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 
573, 670–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Wes Barrett, God 
Returns to Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation, FOX NEWS (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/25/god-returns-to-presidential-thanksgiving-
proclamation.html [http://perma.cc/GER5-5HXC]; Chuck Norris, Obama vs. George 
Washington on Thanksgiving, WORDNETDAILY (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://www.wnd. 
com/2014/11/obama-vs-george-washington-on-thanksgiving/#6Ofv9G2XPslDYBAK.99 
[http://perma.cc/8HAB-DVAE]; Joel Siegel, Obama Leaves God out of Thanksgiving 
Speech, Riles Critics, A.B.C. NEWS (Nov. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-
omits-god-thanksgiving-address-riles-critics/story?id=15028644 [http://perma.cc/5W5D-RBZN]; 
Carson Holloway, Thanksgiving and the Constitution, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/11/11618/ [http://perma.cc/9KPV-QKJM]; DONALD L. 
DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 2–3, 18–20 (2010). 
 3 But why is this “uncovering” so important if you’re not advocating for the abolition 
of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations? What do you have against Thanksgiving!? 
 4 Moral or constitutional? Oh dear! What would Dworkin have said to this distinction? 
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political science interlude on presidential rhetoric. In Section III, 
linkages to Establishment Clause cases and considerations, old 
and new. In Section IV, cameo appearances by some 
unimpeachable Founding presidents/precedents. In Section V, 
select reservations, resignations, and Bible readings. 
I. SO WHAT ARE WE DEALING WITH HERE? SOME EXAMPLES OF 
PRESIDENTIAL THANKSGIVING PROCLAMATIONS 
Many American presidents have issued Thanksgiving 
Proclamations. A central constitutional worry with this practice 
is that it exploits the station of the presidency for the purposes of 
evangelism. As directives from the country’s highest executive 
office, which generally are designed to (1) situate the country’s 
eyes on a certain god, a specific religious tradition, and/or a 
particular set of beliefs, and (2) encourage participation in 
discrete spiritual actions, these proclamations could approach the 
line of religious establishment. 
So what are we dealing with here? These executive actions 
have taken on a variety of forms over the years. Quite a few 
proclamations have served as calls to worship God—wielding 
religious symbols and Judeo-Christian rhetoric to reaffirm a 
preference for a particular belief system and a governmental 
push to embrace that belief system now—while others have 
sounded more like general statements of appreciation for 
the successes and strengths of our nation. Compare, for 
example, President Barack Obama’s 2011 Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamation to President George W. Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving 
Day Proclamation.  
The first sentence of President Obama’s Proclamation 8755 
reads: “One of our Nation’s oldest and most cherished traditions, 
Thanksgiving Day brings us closer to our loved ones and invites 
us to reflect on the blessings that enrich our lives.”5 This opening 
line was indicative of the general tone and thesis of Obama’s 
Thanksgiving Proclamation. The President focused on the origins 
and history of the holiday. He also emphasized the cooperation 
between Native Americans and Pilgrims, the valuable 
contributions of Native Americans, and the importance of 
diversity, family, and friendship in the good times and bad.6  
President Obama also mentioned that Americans “give 
thanks to each other and to God for the kindness and comforts 
 
 5 President Barack Obama, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8755 (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97063 [http://perma.cc/R5T3-9QKD]. 
 6 Id.  
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that grace our lives.”7 With the exception of one reference to 
George Washington’s praise of God in the first presidential 
Thanksgiving Proclamation, this was the only time the word 
“God” appeared in President Obama’s Proclamation.8 Instead of 
invoking a certain god or a specific religious tradition, President 
Obama exhorted: 
[T]he people of the United States to come together—whether in our 
homes, places of worship, community centers, or any place of 
fellowship for friends and neighbors—to give thanks for all we have 
received in the past year, to express appreciation to those whose lives 
enrich our own, and to share our bounty with others.9 
Three years before President Obama’s Proclamation, 
President George W. Bush gave his final Thanksgiving 
Proclamation.10 In his opening paragraph, President Bush 
declared: “We recognize that all of these blessings, and life itself, 
come not from the hand of man but from Almighty God.”11 Unlike 
President Obama’s Proclamation, President Bush’s address 
centered on religion, thankfulness to God, and pronouncements 
of faith that the Christian God (that many of our Founding 
Fathers turned to) would continue to help the United States.12 He 
also counseled Americans to “let us all give thanks to God who 
blessed our Nation’s first days and who blesses us today. May He 
continue to guide and watch over our families and our 
country always.”13 
President Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving Proclamation is not an 
outlier in terms of religious rhetoric and instruction. Just look at 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Proclamation more than five 
decades earlier.14 In Proclamation 3036, President Eisenhower 
supplied a very short, priestly admonishment for citizens to 
genuflect.15 Wasting no time or ink, the Proclamation’s 
introduction dove right into a direct call to prayer: 
As a Nation much blessed, we feel impelled at harvest time to follow 
the tradition handed down by our Pilgrim fathers of pausing from our 
labors for one day to render thanks to Almighty God for His bounties. 
Now that the year is drawing to a close, once again it is fitting that we 
 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 President George W. Bush, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8322 (Nov. 21, 2008), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84954 [http://perma.cc/PAR7-BB2B]. 
 11 Id.  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 3036 (Nov. 7, 
1953), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72469 [http://perma.cc/W7BN-25G8]. 
 15 Id. 
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 4:19 PM 
2018]  Rethinking Thanksgiving Day Proclamations 23 
incline our thoughts to His mercies and offer to Him our special 
prayers of gratitude.16 
Eisenhower’s proclamation from 1953 designated the 
American population to be “a religious people,” faithful to the 
presumably Christian God but still in need of some good, 
old-fashioned kneeling.17 On Thanksgiving, he told the country to 
“bow before God in contrition for our sins, in suppliance for 
wisdom in our striving for a better world, and in gratitude for the 
manifold blessings He has bestowed upon us and upon our 
fellow men.”18 
II. PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
Although there has been remarkably little scholarly analysis 
of Thanksgiving Proclamations, recent American political 
scientific research does illuminate some of the cardinal political 
worries surrounding this governmental practice.19 For example, 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations have a breadth, 
directness, and authoritativeness that other controversial forms 
of government benediction do not possess. In fact, the president 
has unrivaled rhetorical powers in American politics. 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See James W. Ceaser et al., The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, 11 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 158, 159–61 (1981); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS 
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 445– 46 (1993); 
KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PRESIDENTS CREATING THE 
PRESIDENCY: DEEDS DONE IN WORDS 6–9 (2008); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Rhetoric 
and the Public Agenda, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87–89 (1995); Todd Garvey, The Obama 
Administration’s Evolving Approach to the Signing Statement, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
393, 394–95, 406 (2011); Vanessa B. Beasley, Speaking at Selma: Presidential 
Commemoration and Bill Clinton’s Problem of Invention, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 267, 
268–69, 286–87 (2014); Jeffrey Friedman, A “Weapon in the Hands of the People”: The 
Rhetorical Presidency in Historical and Conceptual Context, 19 CRITICAL REV. 197, 199–
200 (2007); ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE 
PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 2–6 (2009); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE 
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4 (1987); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Revisiting the Rhetorical 
Presidency, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4, 13–14 (1996); Christopher S. 
Kelley et al., Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements, 43 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 274, 274–76 (2013); Michael J. Berry, Controversially Executing 
the Law: George W. Bush and the Constitutional Signing Statement, 36 CONGRESS & THE 
PRESIDENCY 244, 244–45, 266–68 (2009); Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The 
Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements, 38 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 248, 248–67 (2008); Martin J. Medhurst, A Tale of Two Constructs: The 
Rhetorical Presidency versus Presidential Rhetoric, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL 
PRESIDENCY xi–xxv (1996); WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE 
POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION  176–77(2003); BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO 
LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC 3–5 (2006); SAMUEL KERNELL, 
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–2 (3d ed. 2007). 
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According to political scientist Keith Whittington, 
presidential rhetoric has a disparate and more pronounced role 
in modern times than in the early years of American political 
history.20 Since the twentieth century, Americans have witnessed 
a different brand of president—an institutional actor more 
willing to engage with the public, by giving more speeches, 
making more proclamations, and attempting to connect directly 
with citizens.21 This rhetorical shift in the modern presidency is 
aimed at exerting political power over the citizenry—influencing 
public sentiment by rallying support or disdain, pushing certain 
policy agendas, and inculcating particular civic values and 
practices. Whittington writes, “[p]residential rhetoric not only 
persuades but also constructs a political world within which 
various political actors operate.”22  
Presidency scholars take note of the disproportionate 
amount of public attention that is paid to presidential discourse 
and how this coverage creates a greater number of political 
opportunities for the chief executive.23 Presidential rhetoric can 
significantly impact public opinion and influence policy.24 When a 
president speaks to the public, his words have the power to 
increase the salience of certain issues and civic practices.25 
Modern presidents rely on rhetorical performances such as 
directives, public speeches, and proclamations to set agendas and 
communicate to the American people how they prioritize 
different people, cultures, and values. 
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: CASES, 
PRECEDENTS, AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The historical scrutiny that has been leveled against 
a constellation of related governmental institutions, persons, 
and practices seriously informs the legal and normative 
considerations about presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
These adjacent religious figures and observances include prayers 
issued at the start of municipal meetings and state appointments 
and uses of chaplains and benedictions at public school 
graduations and athletic events. Now, although there are 
important distinctions between Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
 
 20 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and 
President Clinton, 26 PERSP. POL. SCI. 199, 199–201 (1997). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 205. 
 23 See generally Cohen, supra note 19; CANES-WRONE, supra note 19; KERNELL, 
supra note 19. 
 24 See Cohen, supra note 19, at 87–88, 101, 103. 
 25 See CANES-WRONE, supra note 19, at 19–23; see also KERNELL, supra note 19, at 1–9. 
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this constellation (with many of these distinctions casting 
additional doubt on the constitutionality of presidential 
proclamations), it would be wise to first highlight the significant 
number of similarities and legal precedents involved. 
The most relevant constitutional provision to these matters 
is the Establishment Clause, which reads: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”26 Located within 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, this clause 
initially prohibited only the federal government from respecting 
an establishment of religion. 
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
incorporated the Establishment Clause, thus extending the 
prohibition to states.27 The divided Court provided important 
clarification to this short constitutional clause.28 Everson, one of 
the foundational twentieth century Establishment Clause cases, 
highlighted the guiding principles within the Clause, principles 
which—to this day—serve as a controversial set of standards for 
Establishment Clause analysis. In direct and forceful language, 
Justice Hugo Black articulated the strict separation enshrined by 
the Clause: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”29  
Although the Justices were divided about how to apply the 
Establishment Clause to the case before them, the Court was 
unified about the strict separation principles undergirding the 
Clause: the Government must be neutral between religions and 
 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 27 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 28 See id. (finding “[t]hat [the First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in 
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the 
state to be their adversary”). 
 29 Id. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). 
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also between religion and non-religion; state and national 
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by 
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion; the 
government also would violate the Establishment Clause by 
demonstrating religious disfavor through a national or state law 
that actively harms a religion or its institutions, practices, 
and adherents.30 
But, in practice, how strict must the separation be between 
church and state? How do we know when the government has not 
been neutral towards religion? Must a citizen prove that the 
government coerced her into participating in an alien religious 
practice in order for the courts to be sure that a breach of the 
Establishment Clause has occurred? In a series of cases following 
Everson, many of which explicitly dealt with the topic of 
governmentally-sanctioned prayer, the Court provided greater 
definition to the strict separation principles within the 
Establishment Clause. 
A. Prayer and Public Schools 
In Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
governmentally approved prayer said daily in New York public 
schools represented an impermissible establishment of religion.31 
In a 6-to-1 ruling, the Court outlined the manifold problems with 
this sort of religious entanglement and promotion. Using 
sweeping language, the Justices in the majority argued that it is 
problematic for the government to encourage prayer—and not 
just because of the age of the admonished audience, but because 
of the state-sanctioned nature of the religious act.32 Justice Black 
turned to James Madison’s writings for historical support. He 
asserted: “The Establishment Clause thus stands as an 
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our 
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to 
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”33  
The majority and concurring opinions in Engel also were 
clear that a governmental policy may violate the Establishment 
Clause even when no one is legally compelled to participate in a 
religious practice. Distinguishing the Establishment Clause from 
the Free Exercise Clause that follows in the First Amendment, 
the majority claimed the Establishment Clause “does not depend 
 
 30 See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1. 
 31 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962). 
 32 See id. at 424–25, 432–33. 
 33 Id. at 431–32 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787, 
at 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
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upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is 
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official 
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”34 A year later, in School District 
of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, the high court 
again struck down governmentally-approved prayers and Bible 
readings, reiterating that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
is predicated on coercion, while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended.”35  
Two additional Supreme Court cases offer insight into the 
constitutionality of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In 
Lee v. Weisman, the Court determined whether the Establishment 
Clause forbids clergy from offering non-denominational prayers at 
middle school and high school graduation ceremonies.36 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy dedicated a good deal 
of ink showcasing the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect 
coercion,” and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions.37 
Those individuals who would not willingly participate in such 
prayers are placed in an uncomfortable situation in which 
religious activity is either required or is costly to avoid (because of 
the incredible social pressure that comes along with abstaining 
from participation). It was clear to the majority that although a 
governmental practice does not have to be coercive to contravene 
Americans’ religious liberty, coerced participation in prayer 
certainly is unconstitutional: “[T]he Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way 
which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends 
to do so.’”38  
As in Engel (and numerous other Establishment cases) the 
writings, speeches, and actions of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison were used authoritatively by both the majority and 
 
 34 Id. at 430; see also id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no element of 
compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation requiring that public schools be opened 
each day with the following prayer . . . a child is free to stand or not stand, to recite or not 
recite, without fear of reprisal or even comment by the teacher or any other 
school official.”). 
 35 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); see 
also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985) (holding an Alabama law that required 
public schools to set aside a short period of class time for silence, meditation, or prayer 
violated the First Amendment). 
 36 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992). 
 37 Id. at 588, 592–93. 
 38 Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
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dissenting Justices in Lee.39 In fact, Justice David Souter’s 
concurrence, which was joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, 
relied on Thomas Jefferson’s well-documented objection to 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to support the view 
that the Establishment Clause entails no state endorsement 
of religion.40 
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of a prayer offered by a high school 
student and broadcast before high school football games in Santa 
Fe, Texas.41 Following Lee, the Court stressed the heightened 
coercion and social pressure involved in this practice of praying 
“on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school’s 
public address system, by a speaker representing the student 
body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a 
school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public 
prayer.”42 Writing for the six-member majority, Justice John Paul 
Stevens found the school district improperly “invite[d] and 
encourage[d] religious messages.”43 The Establishment Clause 
cannot brook this sort of “perceived and actual endorsement 
of religion.”44 
As in earlier Establishment cases, the presidential practice 
of making Thanksgiving Proclamations hovered in the 
background of Santa Fe. Whereas the majority of the Court 
claimed that “the religious liberty protected by the Constitution 
is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular 
religious practice of prayer,”45 the dissenting Justices—led by 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—rejoined: 
Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George 
Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed 
the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of “public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the 
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”46  
 
 39 See id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson, in his second 
inaugural address, specifically “acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his 
audience to join his prayer”); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962). 
 40 Id. at 623 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 41 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315–17 (2000). 
 42 Id. at 290. 
 43 Id. at 306. 
 44 Id. at 305. 
 45 Id. at 313. 
 46 Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting George Washington, Presidential 
Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in 1 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 64 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)). 
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Prayer cases such as these should bear heavily on our 
evaluation of the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
For if a high school student cannot give a “nonsectarian, 
nonproselytizing” prayer before an audience of a few hundred 
people, 47 it is difficult to imagine how the President of the United 
States can give a (sometimes highly sectarian) prayer and 
encourage hundreds of millions of Americans to continue with 
more (sometimes highly sectarian) praying. If “the members of 
the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a 
public expression of the views of the majority of the student body 
delivered with the approval of the school administration,” is it 
not reasonable to assume that the American people also perceive 
the president’s Thanksgiving Proclamation as an expression of the 
public’s view, endorsed by the United States federal government?48  
B. Legislative Prayer 
Two Supreme Court cases addressed aspects of legislative 
prayer that are informative of constitutional questions and the 
specific modes of analysis that may be involved in reconsidering 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. 
The first of these cases concerns state appointments and 
uses of chaplains. In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court considered 
whether the Nebraska state government violated the 
Establishment Clause by authorizing a chaplain to conduct 
prayers before legislative sessions.49 Of added legal concern was 
the fact that “a clergyman of only one denomination has been 
selected by the Nebraska Legislature for 16 years, that the 
chaplain is paid at public expense, and that the prayers are in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition[.]”50  
The Court ruled 6-to-3 that the chaplaincy position and 
legislative prayers did not constitute an establishment of 
religion. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger penned the majority 
opinion, which gave special weight to this practice of “unique 
history” and tradition, and argued that the chaplain’s duties 
served as “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held.”51  
In a blistering dissent, Justice William Brennan rejoined 
that these government-sanctioned prayers are at odds with the 
Constitution and inconsistent with the Court’s previous 
 
 47 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294. 
 48 Id. at 308. 
 49 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). 
 50 Id. at 783–84. 
 51 Id. at 791–92. 
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decisions.52 The simple fact that Nebraska’s legislature—as well 
as the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and many 
state legislatures—has a rich history of praying before sessions 
does not erase the Establishment transgression. In pointed 
response to the majority opinion, Justice Brennan noted: “Prayer 
is serious business—serious theological business—and it is not a 
mere ‘acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of 
this country’ for the State to immerse itself in that business.”53 
The fact that a large number of Americans share a particular 
faith or participate in a similar religious practice only increases 
the need for a robust Establishment Clause and a “wall between 
church and state” that is “kept high and impregnable.”54 
Government-sanctioned prayer, including prayer from a 
legislative chaplain, undercuts the fundamental purposes of the 
Establishment Clause and instead “forces all residents of the 
State to support a religious exercise that may be contrary to their 
own beliefs. It requires the State to commit itself on fundamental 
theological issues.”55 
More than thirty years after Marsh was decided, the Court 
returned to the matter in Town of Greece v. Galloway. In Greece, 
the Court evaluated the constitutionality of prayers offered at the 
start of municipal meetings.56 In the town of Greece, New York, 
the municipal council regularly invited local clergymen to deliver 
an invocation before meetings began and government business 
was conducted. Many of the prayers were Christian in nature 
and were given by Christian clergymen, for “nearly all of the 
congregations in town were Christian.”57 
In one of the most anticipated Establishment Clause rulings 
handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court this decade, the Greece 
Court, divided 5-to-4, found the town council prayers to be a 
constitutional exercise.58 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy worked hard to elaborate the critically 
non-religious aspects of the pre-meeting invocations. According to 
the majority, the prayers were redeemable because they 
 
 52 See id. at 795–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 819. 
 54 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 55 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 808 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 56 See Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014). 
 57 Id. at 1816. During the more than 120 monthly meetings at which prayers were 
delivered during the record period (from 1999 to 2010), only four prayers were delivered 
by non-Christians. These four prayers occurred in 2008, shortly after the plaintiffs began 
complaining about the town’s Christian prayer practice and nearly a decade after that 
practice had commenced. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 58 Id. at 1813. 
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furnished a number of secular benefits.59 For instance, the 
clergyman’s invocation “lends gravity to public business, reminds 
lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher 
purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and 
peaceful society.”60 Justice Kennedy stressed the purely 
ceremonial and somehow innocuous nature of this form of 
government prayer, arguing it is a benign part of our heritage 
and “intended to place town board members in a solemn and 
deliberative frame of mind.”61 
Offsetting his language about the ceremonial and 
significantly secular nature of the town council prayers, Justice 
Kennedy explored the setting and audience for the prayers to 
ascertain the extent to which people were being coerced into 
religious participation.62 Fortunately for Kennedy & Co., the 
critically non-religious religious oration was determined to be 
non-coercive and principally directed at lawmakers. Justice 
Kennedy was clear to point out that “[t]he analysis would be 
different if town board members directed the public to participate 
in the prayers . . . . Although board members themselves stood, 
bowed their heads, or made the sign of the cross during the 
prayer, they at no point solicited similar gestures by the 
public.”63 The majority’s logic clearly hinged on the limited 
number of citizens that attended town council meetings, citizens 
were not the intended audience for the prayers, and attendants’ 
ability to opt out of listening and participating. 
The brightest parts of Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting 
opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, sharply disagreed over 
this very evaluation of the setting and audience for town council 
prayers. According to the four dissenters, many members of the 
audience during these council meetings were members of the 
general public.64 Moreover, “the prayers there [were] directed 
squarely at the citizens.”65 
An especially damning characteristic of the prayers was 
their association with a single religion—Christianity. Justice 
 
 59 Id. at 1818. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1816. 
 62 See id. at 1825 (“It is an elemental First Amendment principle that government 
may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.’ . . . The 
inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer 
arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)). 
 63 Town of Greece, N.Y., 134 S. Ct. at 1826. 
 64 Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 1848. 
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Kagan was especially troubled by the establishment risks that 
attend to this level of sectarianism. In her dissent, Kagan 
walked through several examples of governmental actors—a 
judge, an election official, an official at a naturalization 
ceremony—engaging in public religious invocations to show how 
“prayer repeatedly invoking a single religion’s beliefs in these 
settings—crossed a constitutional line.”66 This clashes with the 
principle of full and equal citizenship guaranteed by the 
Establishment Clause. A government-sponsored prayer aligned 
with a single faith can offer the impression that they are less 
than full citizens and their equal rights and equal ownership 
over democratic government is predicated on an established 
religious orthodoxy.67 In the closing paragraph of her opinion, 
Justice Kagan reinforced this point, writing: “When the citizens 
of this country approach their government, they do so only as 
Americans, not as members of one faith or another . . . they 
should not confront government-sponsored worship that divides 
them along religious lines.”68  
C. Grounds for Reconsidering Thanksgiving Proclamations 
Not coincidentally, almost every court case discussed so far 
included some judicial reference to, or sustained commentary 
on, American presidents’ practice of issuing Thanksgiving 
Proclamations. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
evaluated this particular practice, it certainly has given citizens 
the resources to do so. The arguments best equipped to cast doubt 
on the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations certainly 
include materials from the aforementioned constellation of 
governmental institutions, persons, and practices. Many of the 
precedents and modes of judicial reasoning generated by the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, spanning 
at least from Everson to Greece, complicate our historical 
embrace of presidential prayers and executive calls to thank and 
praise God. 
For decades now, courts have turned to Everson v. Board of 
Education when explicating the strict separation principles 
undergirding the Establishment Clause. Based on these 
 
 66 Id. at 1843. 
 67 Id. at 1841 (“I think the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violate that norm of 
religious equality—the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea that our public 
institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu than to the Methodist or 
Episcopalian. . . . In my view, that practice does not square with the First Amendment’s 
promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in 
her government.”). 
 68 Id. at 1854. 
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principles, it seems that presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 
must be neutral between religions and also between religion and 
non-religion for them to pass constitutional muster. These official 
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by 
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion. After 
examining the various Thanksgiving Proclamations of the past, it 
should be clear that many of these executive statements have 
favored religion generally and also favored a specific religion. 
Those who may claim that Thanksgiving Day Proclamations 
are vindicated by the fact that such Proclamations do not force 
citizens into religious observance should return to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Engel and Abington. In these cases, 
the Court communicated the State’s constitutional duty to avoid 
this exact sort of religious entanglement and promotion.69 
State-sanctioned calls for prayer are constitutionally suspect, 
even when no one is legally compelled to participate in the 
religious practice. This is because a government practice does not 
have to be coercive to violate the Establishment Clause. 
Following the holdings in Lee and Santa Fe, we might 
wonder about the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect coercion,” 
and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions, which flow 
from an individual who is regularly interpreted as the leader of 
the free world and the most powerful person on Earth.70 A strong 
claim could be made that the president’s words disseminate as a 
“perceived and actual endorsement of religion.”71 
Although the outcomes of Marsh and Greece appear to justify 
Thanksgiving Proclamations, this is not necessarily the case. The 
United States does not have a unique and unbroken history of 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Not every president 
has delivered this sort of religious message, and several who 
have issued Proclamations were troubled by their actions and/or 
used brief, muted, and/or secular declarations.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s 
dissenting opinion in Greece both illustrated the added 
constitutional obstacles facing presidential Thanksgiving 
addresses. Thanksgiving Proclamations are not purely 
ceremonial and innocuous words, issued by a local minister to a 
small crowd. Many of these Proclamations include religious 
exhortations, deeply theistic messages, and explicitly 
Judeo-Christian language and references. If four Justices of the 
 
 69 See supra Section III(A). 
 70 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 588, 592–93 (1992). 
 71 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000). 
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Court were made queasy by the town council of Greece’s strong 
association with a single clerical background, they must surely 
shudder by the language of Thanksgiving Proclamations and 
their common religious affiliation. 
Even the majority opinion in Greece was adamant that “[t]he 
analysis would be different if town board members directed the 
public to participate in the prayers.”72 The setting and audience 
for presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations is the public at 
large—political recipients of executive orders and messages. 
These Proclamations represent official governmental statements 
and are widely reported in the media. Moreover, many of these 
Proclamations clearly direct the public to participate in prayers.  
IV. “THOU SHALT NOT MAKE RELIGIOUS PROCLAMATIONS” – JAMES 
MADISON AND THOMAS JEFFERSON 
In addition to the conventional political scientific wisdom on 
presidential rhetoric and the relevant First Amendment 
jurisprudence on government-sanctioned prayer, several frank 
opinions from the founding generation may prove valuable to the 
evaluation of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Some 
may consider this line of inquiry to be a fool’s errand, especially 
because the first two presidents—George Washington and John 
Adams—both felt comfortable in offering Thanksgiving 
Proclamations.73 Several influential leaders (and presidents) in 
the early years of our nation, however, expressed serious 
concerns over these exact practices. 
An unmistakable characteristic of the Establishment Clause 
case law is the repeated struggles between competing historian-
Justices over how best to appropriate (and pay homage to) James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Madison and Jefferson wrote 
 
 72 Id. at 1826. 
 73 After he left office, however, John Adams seemed less comfortable with these 
decisions. See From John Adams to Benjamin Rush, 12 June 1812, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5807 [http://perma.cc/DWH2-B2FE] 
(last modified June 29, 2017).  
The National Fast, recommended by me turned me out of Office. It was 
connected with, the general Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, which I had 
no concern in. . . . A general Suspicion prevailed that the Presbyterian Church 
was ambitious and aimed at an Establishment as a National Church. I was 
represented as a Presbyterian and at the head of this political and 
ecclesiastical Project. The Secret Whisper ran through them all the Sects ‘Let 
Us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, any body, whether they be Philosophers, 
Deist or even Atheists, rather than a Presbyterian President.’ This Principle is 
at the Bottom of the Unpopularity of national Fasts and Thanksgivings, 
Nothing is more dreaded than the National Government meddling 
with Religion. 
Id. 
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and spoke extensively on the topic of religious liberty, and both 
men were active in securing a strong separation of church and 
state while they served in governmental positions. 
On the religion clauses of the First Amendment, these 
Founders’ words have been “accepted almost as an authoritative 
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment.”74 For 
example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Everson brim 
with dozens of references to these two men.75 The Court turned to 
Madison and Jefferson throughout, as Establishment Clause 
exponents, experts, and historical beacons.76 So if the actions and 
views of Madison and Jefferson are believed to offer “irrefutable 
confirmation of the Amendment’s sweeping content,”77 what can 
the lives of these two statesmen tell us about presidential 
Thanksgiving Proclamations? 
For at least the past 140 years, Supreme Court Justices have 
trusted Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists as a 
reliable companion text to the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.78 Believing this 
letter helps to explicate the purposes and principles lying within 
our constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty protections, 
constitutional commentators have fought over the true meaning 
and history of Jefferson’s missive.79 Interestingly enough, a 
primary purpose behind President Jefferson’s letter pertains to 
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations.  
 
 74 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).  
 75 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 34 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 76 See generally id. 
 77 Id. at 34. 
 78 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.  
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and 
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that 
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building 
a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of 
the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see 
with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore 
to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to 
his social duties. 
 Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson). 
 79 See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 
(2010); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE (First Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2002); VINCENT PHILLIP MUNOZ, GOD AND THE 
FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON (2009); JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION 
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 2000). 
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During his eight years as President, Jefferson never 
made such a Proclamation. Understanding the controversy 
surrounding this political decision, Jefferson relied on his Letter 
to the Danbury Baptists “to explain his reasons for refusing to 
issue presidential proclamations of days for public fasting and 
thanksgiving.”80 On the same day that Jefferson sent the letter, 
he explained to then-attorney general Levi Lincoln these very 
intentions: “[T]he Baptist address now inclosed [sic] admits of a 
condemnation of the alliance between church and state, under 
the authority of the Constitution. [I]t furnishes an occasion too, 
which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim 
fastings & thanksgivings.”81 
Although Jefferson had issued a Thanksgiving Proclamation 
more than twenty years earlier, as governor of Virginia, he did 
not believe the president was constitutionally authorized to 
engage in this sort of religious practice.82 During his final term in 
office, Jefferson reiterated his constitutional view on the matter: 
I consider the government of the U.S. as interdicted by the 
constitution from intermedling with religious institutions, their 
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. [T]his results not only from the 
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment, or 
free exercise, of religion, but from that also which reserves to the 
states the powers not delegated to the U.S. certainly no power to 
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious 
discipline, has been delegated to the general government . . . but it is 
only proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting 
& prayer. [T]hat is that I should indirectly assume to the U.S. an 
authority over religious exercises which the constitution has directly 
precluded them from. [I]t must be meant too that this 
recommendation is to carry some authority, and to be sanctioned by 
some penalty on those who disregard it: not indeed of fine & 
imprisonment but of some degree of proscription perhaps in public 
opinion. [A]nd does the change in the nature of the penalty make the 
recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it 
is directed?83 
 
 80 DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2, 27–30 (2002). 
 81 Thomas Jefferson, To Levi Lincoln, 1 Jan. 1802, in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: DECEMBER 1, 1801 TO MARCH 3, 1802, at 256–57 (Barbara B. Obery ed., 2009), 
available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/levi-lincoln-0 
[http://perma.cc/CK8A-7BLQ]. 
 82 President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and 
Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0187 
[http://perma.cc/2CWW-5WCN]. 
 83 From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, 23 January 1808, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-7257 [http://perma.cc/VVU8-WSJH] 
(last modified June 29, 2017).  
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Jefferson steadfastly believed it was not the responsibility of the 
president to direct a religious activity. Even if no legal 
compulsion accompanies the president’s rhetoric, these official 
Thanksgiving Proclamations have the power to produce 
social pressure, inequality, and religious division among the 
American people. 
James Madison, who played an instrumental role in the 
construction and congressional passage of the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment, shared Jefferson’s constitutional worries 
and spent decades expressing his disapprobation with 
Thanksgiving Proclamations and similar practices. In his 
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, 
Madison expounded his belief in a meaningful separation of 
church and state.84 Madison’s petition argued a government 
could only secure religious equality for its citizens if it abstained 
from establishing a single faith or using public resources to 
support religion.85 Religious life would thrive best, Madison 
reasoned, when it was divorced from government aid and our 
political institutions would operate most effectively when they 
did not depend on religious alliances.86 
Madison’s commitment to a mutually beneficial divorce 
between church and state elucidates his discomfort with 
presidential Thanksgiving Day Proclamations. Unlike Jefferson, 
Madison did make such Proclamations while President. He was, 
however, cognizant of the public concern over the constitutionality 
and propriety of “religious Proclamations” coming from the 
presidency, and he wrote quite a bit about these religious 
exercises (even to President James Monroe).87  
In his Detached Memoranda, Madison deemed the 
appointment and use of legislative chaplains to be 
 
 84 Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 
[http://perma.cc/2ZEU-W4Q9] (last modified June 29, 2017). 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. (“If ‘all men are by nature equally free and independent,’ all men are to be 
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and 
therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to 
be considered as retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the 
dictates of Conscience.’ Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess 
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an 
equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has 
convinced us.”). 
 87 See From James Madison to James Monroe, 11 December 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0339 [http://perma.cc/4QTD-XTCF] 
(last modified June 29, 2017).  
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unconstitutional.88 Immediately following this evaluation, he 
articulated why “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive 
recommending thanksgivings & fasts are shoots from the same 
root with the legislative acts reviewed.”89 Madison went into 
detail on this point, recounting his legal, political, and historical 
“objections” to these Proclamations. These objections include the 
national government’s lack of legal authority to instruct religious 
activities such as prayer, the Proclamation’s offering the 
impression of an established national religion, and the possibility 
that politicians and political parties would use these prayers to 
serve political ends.90 
In an 1822 letter to Edward Livingston, Madison again 
identified Thanksgiving Proclamations as a practice that 
compromised “a perfect separation between ecclesiastical & Civil 
matters” in the United States.91 Madison complained: “There has 
been another deviation from the strict principle, in the Executive 
Proclamations of fasts and festivals; so far at least as they have 
spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the 
equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution.”92 
Madison remained hopeful, though, about the future of religious 
liberty, telling Livingston: “I have no doubt that every new 
example will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing 
that Religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less 
they are mixed together.”93  
Madison’s optimism was not entirely misplaced. The 
presidents immediately succeeding Madison stopped the practice. 
It was not until the 1860s, more than forty years after the last 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation was made, that Moses 
spoke again. 
V. ON NON-CONCLUSIONS AND THERMIDOR  
The political power of presidential rhetoric, the development 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the opinions of a few, 
long-dead Founding Fathers—where does all this leave us? Some 
may think it leads to a robust constitutional claim against 
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Others may pray that 
 
 88 Detatched Memoranda, CA. 31 January 1820, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549 [http://perma.cc/64V2-WW3R] (last modified 
June 29, 2017). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 From James Madison to Edward Livingston, 10 July 1822, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0471 [http://perma.cc/WU5T-CSLA] 
(last modified June 29, 2017).  
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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it leads nowhere—drowned out by at least an equal number of 
political, scientific, legal, and historical materials and 
counterclaims. Let’s leave that necessary dialectic for a different 
day and another law review article. Until then, remaining 
puzzles (or excursus): 
Some Thanksgiving Proclamations have been neither as 
separationist as President Obama’s nor as catechismal as 
President Bush’s or President Eisenhower’s. The subject of 
President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 
was hope and determination.94 President Carter highlighted the 
countless obstacles through which the American people have 
persevered: Pilgrims struggling on a new continent, a later 
generation maintaining faith during the Revolutionary War, and 
subsequent Americans remaining confident in the nation’s future 
even as the Civil War raged.95 This Thanksgiving Proclamation 
was dedicated to a people who always made it through, who were 
virtuous, successful, and capable of finding their way out 
of trials. 
Near the end of his Proclamation, President Carter did “ask 
all Americans to give thanks on that day for the blessings 
Almighty God has bestowed upon us, and seek to be good 
stewards of what we have received.”96 But the President’s 
broader message to the United States seems to have been one of 
collective praise and unity, encouraging citizens to “be thankful 
in proportion to that which we have received, trusting not in our 
wealth and comforts, but in the strength of our purpose.”97 
. . .  
“I have seen these people,” the Lord said to Moses, “and they are a 
stiff-necked people. Now leave me alone so that my anger may burn 
against them and that I may destroy them. Then I will make you into 
a great nation.” 
But Moses sought the favor of the Lord his God. “Lord,” he said, “why 
should your anger burn against your people, whom you brought out of 
Egypt with great power and a mighty hand? Why should the 
Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that he brought them out, to 
kill them in the mountains and to wipe them off the face of the earth’? 
Turn from your fierce anger; relent and do not bring disaster on your 
people. Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom 
you swore by your own self: ‘I will make your descendants as 
numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give your descendants all 
 
 94 President Jimmy Carter, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 4693 (Sept. 28, 1979), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31444 [http://perma.cc/BMJ2-YCTY].  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 4:19 PM 
40 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance 
forever.’” Then the Lord relented and did not bring on his people the 
disaster he had threatened. 
Moses turned and went down the mountain with the two tablets of the 
covenant law in his hands. They were inscribed on both sides, front 
and back. The tablets were the work of God; the writing was the 
writing of God, engraved on the tablets. 
When Joshua heard the noise of the people shouting, he said to Moses, 
“There is the sound of war in the camp.” 
Moses replied: “It is not the sound of victory, it is not the sound of 
defeat; it is the sound of singing that I hear.” 
When Moses approached the camp and saw the calf and the dancing, 
his anger burned and he threw the tablets out of his hands, breaking 
them to pieces at the foot of the mountain. And he took the calf the 
people had made and burned it in the fire; then he ground it to 
powder, scattered it on the water and made the Israelites drink it.98 
 
 
 
 98 Exodus 32: 9-20. 
